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Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments

Citation: Hartmann, Stephan and Bovens, L (2002) Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments.

We appeal to the theory of Bayesian Networks to model different strategies for obtaining confirmation for a hypothesis from experimental test results provided by less than fully reliable instruments. In particular, we consider (i) repeated measurements of a single testable consequence of the hypothesis, (ii) measurements of multiple testable consequences of the hypothesis, (iii) theoretical support for the reliability of the instrument, and (iv) calibration procedures. We evaluate these strategies on their relative merits under idealized conditions and show some surprising repercussions on the variety-of-evidence thesis and the Duhem-Quine thesis.Article

Additional Information: Citation: Philosophy of Science (2002) 69: 29-72.
Creators: Hartmann, Stephan and Bovens, L and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: Bayesianism, Confirmation theory
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
Collections: London Philosophy Papers
Dates:
  • 2002 (published)
Comments and Suggestions:
Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2008-03-02T17:00:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 S_Hartmann_Instruments.pdf: 2267659 bytes, checksum: b4f380b34be968bc8be968c7485dbc91 (MD5); Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2008-03-02T17:00:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 S_Hartmann_Instruments.pdf: 2267659 bytes, checksum: b4f380b34be968bc8be968c7485dbc91 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002. Date accessioned: 2008-03-02T17:00:45Z; Date available: 2008-03-02T17:00:45Z; Date issued: 2002.

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