Abstract
In the paper to which I am responding, Professor Ayers has set himself the task of formulating a tenable version of realism. Professor Ayers does a number of things: he provides his reading of the origins and developments of the debate about realism and its alternatives in modern philosophy; he criticises some recent prominent ideas, as either inconsistent with realism, and hence as being, as he sees it, idealist, or as being in other ways inadequate; and, he spells out, sometimes without fully developing them, different aspects of the views he favours. Ayers's discussion is both interesting and rich, and my response cannot engage with much of it. I shall certainly not attempt to give an answer to the question in Ayers's title.Article
Metadata
Additional Information: | Citation: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2002) 102: 201-228. |
---|---|
Creators: | Snowdon, Paul and |
Subjects: | Philosophy |
Keywords: | Realism, Ayers |
Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
Dates: |
|
Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2008-03-16T20:11:43Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
P_Snowdon_Realism.pdf: 183368 bytes, checksum: e119cccca0c0d0b784fe0c75869c0adb (MD5);
Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2008-03-16T20:11:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
P_Snowdon_Realism.pdf: 183368 bytes, checksum: e119cccca0c0d0b784fe0c75869c0adb (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2002. Date accessioned: 2008-03-16T20:11:43Z; Date available: 2008-03-16T20:11:43Z; Date issued: 2002. |