Abstract
I argue that the central question in the philosophy of perception is the question of whether perceptual experience should be understood in terms of a perceptual relation to the environment, or in terms of intentionality (or representation). The question of whether experience involves ‘qualia’ is, by comparison, not very significant.Article
Metadata
Additional Information: | Citation: T.Gendler & J.Hawthorne (eds.) "Perceptual Experience". |
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Creators: | Crane, Tim and |
Subjects: | Philosophy |
Keywords: | Perception |
Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
Dates: |
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Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T12:30:50Z
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Previous issue date: 2006. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T12:30:50Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T12:30:50Z; Date issued: 2006. |