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Abstract
Intentionalism about consciousness is the view that consciousness is a form of intentionality or mental representation. A popular form of intentionalism says that the conscious or phenomenal character of a state of mind is determined by its intentional content. I argue against this form of intentionalism, and in favour of what David Chalmers calls ‘impure’ intentionalism: the view that the conscious character of a state of mind is determined by its entire intentional nature. NB This version should replace an earlier version of this paper which was on my old website.Article
Metadata
| Additional Information: | Citation: (forthcoming) A.Beckermann & B.McLaughlin (eds.) "Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind". |
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| Creators: | Crane, Tim and |
| Subjects: | Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Thought, Intentionalism |
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
| Dates: |
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T12:37:45Z
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Previous issue date: 2007. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T12:37:45Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T12:37:45Z; Date issued: 2007. |