Citation: Crane, Tim (2006) Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence.
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Abstract
What Brentano meant by ‘intentional inexistence’ is explained, as is Brentano’s change of mind about this notion. It is only when we understand the metaphysical and methodological assumptions lying behind Brentano’s original doctrine that we can understand why we have a problem of intentionality in a way Brentano does not.Article
Metadata
| Creators: | Crane, Tim and |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Brentano, Intentionality |
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
| Dates: |
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z
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Previous issue date: 2006. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T12:45:14Z; Date issued: 2006. |