Abstract
I argue that the metaphysics of the traditional doctrine of emergence is the same as that of non-reductive physicalism; but the doctrines differ in their explanatory ambitions. I am now (2006) not so sure that this is the right way to think about the difference between emergentism and non-reductive physicalism, and I hope to give a better account in some forthcoming work.Article; written in 1997
Metadata
Additional Information: | Citation: B.Loewer & G.Gillett (eds.) "Physicalism and its Discontents". |
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Creators: | Crane, Tim and |
Subjects: | Philosophy |
Keywords: | Physicalism, Emergence |
Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
Dates: |
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Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T13:24:22Z
No. of bitstreams: 1
T_Crane_Emergence.pdf: 214486 bytes, checksum: 4ffdbcc2fb68c40db4e236f979b9dcd4 (MD5);
Description/Provenance: Made available in DSpace on 2007-10-29T13:24:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
T_Crane_Emergence.pdf: 214486 bytes, checksum: 4ffdbcc2fb68c40db4e236f979b9dcd4 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2001;
Description/Provenance: Item withdrawn by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T13:45:34Z
Item was in collections:
London Philosophy Papers (ID: 29)
No. of bitstreams: 1
T_Crane_Emergence.pdf: 214486 bytes, checksum: 4ffdbcc2fb68c40db4e236f979b9dcd4 (MD5). Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T13:24:22Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T13:24:22Z; Date issued: 2001. |