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Abstract
An intentional object is, by definition, the object of an intentional state: what it is that is thought about, wished for, feared etc. This short paper explains why a theory of intentionality should not dispense with the concept of an intentional object, and why the category of intentional object is not an ontological category.Article
Metadata
| Additional Information: | Citation: Ratio (2001) 14: 336-349. |
|---|---|
| Creators: | Crane, Tim and |
| Subjects: | Philosophy |
| Keywords: | Intentionality, Ontology |
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy |
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers |
| Dates: |
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Shahrar Ali (sali@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z
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Previous issue date: 2001. Date accessioned: 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z; Date available: 2007-10-29T13:41:38Z; Date issued: 2001. |