Abstract
A response to Sydney Shoemaker's "Content, Character, and Color". Whereas "Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which" argues that different qualitative aspects of a color are perceptually available to a perceiver in different circumstances of perception, the present paper argues that different qualitative aspects of a color are perceptually available to different perceivers in the same circumstance of perception. Understanding how this could be so undermines Shoemaker's criticisms.Article
Metadata
| Creators: | Kalderon, Mark and | 
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Philosophy | 
| Keywords: | Perception, Colour | 
| Divisions: | Institute of Philosophy | 
| Collections: | London Philosophy Papers | 
| Dates: | 
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| Comments and Suggestions: | Description/Provenance: Submitted by Mark McBride (mark.mcbride@sas.ac.uk) on 2007-11-05T12:12:40Z
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  Previous issue date: 2007.  Date accessioned: 2007-11-05T12:12:40Z;  Date available: 2007-11-05T12:12:40Z;  Date issued: 2007. | 
 
   
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