Respecting Value

A paper presented to the conference In Pursuit of Reason: Engaging Joseph Raz on Reason and Value, May 12 2006, Institute of Philosophy, University of London. Raz describes his views as having a Kantian origin. This might raise the eyebrow of some neo-Kantians or anyone inclined to interpret Kant as a formalist or as a constructivist. Nevertheless, I believe that Raz's views and Kant's, properly interpreted and developed, have more in common than even Raz suspects. To bring this out, I will take up three questions that Raz raises concerning Kant's doctrine: 1. Why is there no analogue of the feeling of respect in Kant's treatment of theoretical reason? 2. What is the proper object of respect: the moral law or people considered as ends in themselves? 3. How could people be ends, let alone ends in themselves, if ends are states of affairs intentionally brought about by action?Talk at book symposium