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Representation in Cognitive Science - Replies

Citation: Shea, Nicholas (2019) Representation in Cognitive Science - Replies. Mind & Language . ISSN 1468-0017 (In Press)

Shea Replies to Reviewers - M&L.pdf

Creative Commons: Attribution-No Derivative Works 4.0

In their constructive reviews, Frances Egan, Randy Gallistel and Steven Gross have raised some important problems for the account of content advanced by Nicholas Shea in Representation in Cognitive Science (2018, OUP). Here the author addresses their main challenges as follows. Egan argues that the account includes an unrecognised pragmatic element; and that it makes contents explanatorily otiose. Gallistel raises questions about homomorphism and correlational information. Gross puts the account to work to resolve the dispute about probabilistic contents in perception, but argues that a question remains about whether probabilities are found in the content or instead in the manner of representation.

Creators: Shea, Nicholas (0000-0002-2032-5705) and
Subjects: Philosophy
Keywords: representation theories of content cognitive science varitel semantics
Divisions: Institute of Philosophy
  • 12 December 2019 (accepted)
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